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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 John C. Douglas appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts finding 
him guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree 
murder.  Douglas contends the district court erred by denying his Batson challenge, his 
motion requesting the ability to call counsel anytime during “regular business hours” 
rather than during his scheduled time for telephone use, and his motion for a mistrial. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
Anthony Robins recruited Douglas to murder Elliott Bailey and Travontae1 
Calloway because Robins believed Bailey and Calloway stole several pounds of 
marijuana from him.  (PSI, pp.3-4.)  When Douglas went to Calloway’s residence to 
commit the murders, he also shot Jeanette Juraska, Calloway’s girlfriend, but she 
survived the attack.  (PSI, pp.4-5.) 
The state charged Douglas with two counts of first degree murder for killing 
Elliott Bailey and Travonte Calloway, and one count of attempted first degree murder for 
shooting Jeanette Juraska.  (R., pp.133-135.)  Prior to trial, Douglas joined a motion, filed 
by his co-defendant, Anthony Robins, in which they asked the court to “compel access” 
to their respective defense attorneys in the form of allowing them to contact their 
attorneys any time during “regular business hours” rather than during the one hour of 
scheduled time allotted to them each day.  (R., pp.268-269, 279-280.)  The district court 
                                                 
1 There are various spellings of Travontae included in the record.  (R., p.134; 1/22/2016 
Tr., p.28, L.5; PSI, pp.23, 94.)  The state will use the same spelling used in the charging 




denied the motion “unless and until” Douglas and Robins showed they were actually 
prejudiced by the telephone schedule.  (9/23/2015 Tr.2, p.183, Ls.5-8.)       
During jury selection, Douglas alleged a violation under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986), when the state exercised one of its peremptory challenges to exclude 
Juror 55, the only African American in the jury pool.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.92, L.3 – 
p.93, L.7.)  After the state provided its reasons for challenging Juror 55, Douglas did not 
dispute the state’s explanation, or allege purposeful discrimination, but instead took the 
prosecutor at her “word” that Juror 55 was not excluded based on her race.  (1/19/2016 
Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, Ls.11-22.)  The district court sustained the state’s use of a peremptory 
challenge to excuse Juror 55, finding “no overt racial purpose behind the strike.”  
(1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, L.23 – p.95, L.1.)    
During trial, Douglas moved for a mistrial after Detective Josiah Ransom testified 
that, in trying to identify Douglas, law enforcement received a call from “a DEA agent 
from back East who said they had a CI who had mentioned a murder in Boise” and “said 
that the person was possibly living in Redington, Pennsylvania.”  (1/25/2016 Tr., p.260, 
L.25 – p.264, L.2.)  The district court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, and 
denied the motion.  (1/25/2016 Tr., p.267, Ls.17-22, p.268, L.22 – p.269, L.4.)   
The jury found Douglas guilty of all three counts.  (R., p.502; 1/28/2016 Tr., 
p.388, Ls.7-14.)  The court imposed concurrent fixed life sentences for the first degree 
                                                 
2 There are several separately bound transcripts included in the record on appeal, some of 
which are designated by volume, and some of which are not.  There are also two 
transcripts designated as “Volume 1” – one for the hearing held on 9/23/2015, and one 
for voir dire on the first day of trial.  All transcript citations in this brief will be to the 
date of court proceeding, and because the proceedings held on January 19, 2016 are in 
two separate volumes, the state will also use the volume number when referring to 
proceedings on that date.           
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murder convictions, and a concurrent fixed 15-year sentence for the attempted first 
degree murder conviction.  (R., pp.518-521.)  Douglas filed a timely notice of appeal.  






Douglas states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE BATSON 
CHALLENGE WHEN THE ONLY AFRICAN AMERICAN IN THE 
JURY POOL WAS STRUCK BY THE STATE IN A CASE WITH 
AFRICAN AMERICAN DEFENDANTS 
 
II. WHETHER MR. DOUGLAS WAS DEPRIVED OF MEANINGFUL 
ACCESS TO HIS ATTORNEY 
 
III. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL WHEN THE STATE’S WITNESS GRATUITOUSLY 
TESTIFIED THAT A DEA AGENT SAID A CI CONNECTED MR. 
DOUGLAS TO THE BOISE MURDER 
 
 (Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (capitalization and punctuation original).) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1.  Should this Court decline to consider Douglas’ Batson claim since he 
expressly declined to meet his burden under step three of the Batson analysis, electing 
instead to accept the prosecutor’s representations that the removal of Juror 55 was not 
based on discriminatory intent?  Alternatively, even if the Court considers Douglas’ 
Batson claim, has Douglas failed to meet his burden of showing a Batson violation? 
  
2. Has Douglas failed to show a Sixth Amendment violation based on the 
district court’s denial of his request to allow him to call his attorney anytime he wanted to 
during “regular business hours”?3  
 
3. Has Douglas failed to establish any basis for concluding the district court 




                                                 
3 This same issue has been raised in Douglas’ co-defendant’s case – State v. Robins, 






This Court Should Decline To Consider Douglas’ Batson Claim Because He Effectively 
Withdrew The Challenge In District Court; Even If Considered, Neither The Record Nor 




 Douglas contends the district court erred in “denying his Batson challenge.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  More specifically, Douglas asserts that the state’s peremptory 
challenge to Juror 55 was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)  Douglas’ Batson challenge fails because it is inconsistent with 
the position he took below, it is belied by the record, and Douglas has not identified any 
error in the district court’s finding that there was “no overt racial purpose behind the 
strike.”   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Whether a “proffered reason” for a peremptory challenge violates the Equal 
Protection Clause as a matter of law is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  
State v. Foster, 156 Idaho 727, 732, 330 P.3d 1085, 1090 (Ct. App. 2014).  However, a 
trial court’s finding regarding “the validity of the state’s explanation for exercising 
peremptory challenges on minority jurors” is reviewed on appeal for clear error.  State v. 
Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 86, 856 P.2d 872, 876 (1993).  “[T]he trial court’s finding with 
regard to the state’s explanation will be overturned on appeal only if it is clearly 
erroneous in light of the facts as a whole.”  State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 933, 935 P.2d 




C. Douglas’ Batson Claim Is Waived And Fails On The Merits 
 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the exclusion of a prospective juror based on race is constitutionally 
impermissible; however, a party is otherwise “entitled to exercise permitted peremptory 
challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to [its] view concerning 
the outcome of the case.”  A court applies a three-step test when considering whether the 
use of a peremptory challenge was racially motivated.  Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d 
at 877.  “First, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie 
showing that the challenge was exercised on the basis of race.”  Foster, 152 Idaho at 91, 
266 P.3d at 1196 (citations omitted).  A prima facie case of discrimination exists if the 
challenged juror “is a member of a cognizable racial group” and the juror was challenged 
in order to “remove from the jury members of the defendant’s race.”  Id.  Individuals of 
African American descent are “members of a cognizable racial group” for purposes of a 
Batson challenge.  Id.   
Once a party has met its burden of showing a prima facie case of a racially-
motivated peremptory challenge, the burden shifts to the party who made the challenge to 
articulate a “clear and reasonably specific” race-neutral explanation for its decision.   
Foster, 152 Idaho at 91, 266 P.3d at 1196 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 94).  “A potential 
juror’s demeanor can be a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge to a juror.”  
Foster, 152 Idaho at 91, 266 P.3d at 1196 (citing Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43 (2010)).  
“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [proffered] explanation, the reason 
offered will be deemed race neutral.”  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (quoting 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality)).       
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If a race-neutral explanation is given for the peremptory challenge, the party 
claiming a Batson violation has the burden of persuading the court that, despite the 
explanation, the peremptory challenge is the result of purposeful discrimination based on 
race.  Foster, 152 Idaho at 91, 266 P.3d at 1196 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).  In 
considering whether there has been purposeful discrimination, a trial court may consider 
its own observations during voir dire and whether the demeanor of the party who 
exercised the peremptory challenge “belies a discriminatory intent.”  Foster, 152 Idaho at 
91, 266 P.3d at 1196 (citations omitted).  “The determinations of credibility and 
demeanor lie peculiarly within the trial court’s province and, absent exceptional 
circumstances, [this Court] will defer to the trial court’s findings.”  Id.    
Application of the three-step test to the record shows that the prosecutor’s use of a 
peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 55 was not based on discriminatory intent – a fact 
Douglas expressly accepted below.  Prior to jury selection, prospective jurors received a 
questionnaire.  (See 1/19/2016 Tr., p.170, Ls.3-4.)  After the questionnaires were 
completed, the court held a hearing for the purpose of determining whether certain jurors 
should be stricken based on the questionnaire alone.  (12/14/2015 Tr., p.25, L.24 – p.27, 
L.25.)  At that hearing, the state challenged two prospective jurors for cause, including 
Juror 55.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.116, L.21 – p.120, L.14.)  The state’s request to excuse Juror 
55 was based, in part, on actual bias.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.117, Ls.4-15.)  With respect to 
Juror 55, the state argued that, from its perspective, Juror 55’s questionnaire indicated she 
was not impartial.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.117, Ls.19-21.)  The state “point[ed] the court 
specifically first to page 11 of [Juror 55’s] questionnaire” where she responded “Yes[,] 
[p]eople get wrongly convicted all the time,” to the question, “Do you feel the burden of 
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proof should be greater than beyond a reasonable doubt, such as proof beyond any 
possible doubt or proof to an absolute certainty?”  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.117, L.21 – p.118, 
L.2.)  “In addition,” in response to the question, “Do you have any opinions about law 
enforcement officers that might affect your ability to impartially evaluate the testimony 
of an officer during trial,” Juror 55 answered, “Yes.  They are unfair to black people.”  
(1/15/2016 Tr., p.118, Ls.6-10.)  Because Douglas and Robins are both African 
American, Juror 55’s view of law enforcement was “an issue in this case.”  (1/15/2016 
Tr., p.118, Ls.11-13.)  The state also moved to excuse Juror 55 based on her indication 
that she was “going to be unable to focus because she takes her dad to chemo every 
Friday.”  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.118, Ls.17-22.)   
Robins objected to the state’s motion, arguing that Juror 55’s answers did not 
reveal actual bias and noting that Juror 55 was the only juror in the first 150 “who shares 
the same race as the[ ] defendants.”  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.121, Ls.6-18.)  Because of Juror 
55’s race, Robins argued there needed to be greater scrutiny before excusing her for 
cause.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.121, Ls.19-22.)  Robins further argued: 
 Yes, she has expressed some opinions, both pro law enforcement 
and opinions that could be construed as anti-law enforcement.  But I note 
she indicates her son is an ISP trooper.  She indicates concerns that she 
has when a defendant doesn’t take the witness stand.  And what that 
means. 
 
 And – but she doesn’t indicate anywhere that she’s not willing to 
follow the jury instructions as the court gives them at the conclusion of the 
case.  That she doesn’t indicate that she’s not willing to be fair to these 
two defendants.  And it may be at the conclusion of the voir dire process, 
that she indicates that she can’t follow your instructions.  That she won’t 
follow them, that she has such bias or prejudice against this case or these 
defendants or the State, that she can’t follow the law, but we don’t know 




 And I submit we need to wait until jury selection to make that 
determination. 
 
(1/15/2016 Tr., p.122, Ls.2-19.)   
With respect to the state’s concern regarding Juror 55’s father’s health, Robins 
asserted, “I don’t think we know from her answers the extent of this conflict and whether 
that would truly render her unavailable or unable to focus on the evidence during trial or 
unavailable on one of the Fridays when the trial is scheduled.”  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.122, 
Ls.20-25.)  Robins asked that the court “reserve ruling” on Juror 55 “until she can be 
present in the courtroom and questioned more fully on these points.”  (1/15/2016 Tr., 
p.123, Ls.4-7.)  Douglas “agree[d]” with Robins’ arguments in relation to Juror 55, and 
asserted that striking Juror 55 for cause based solely on her questionnaire was “a bit 
premature.”  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.124, Ls.9-20.) 
In response, the state reiterated its position that Juror 55 should be stricken, but 
asked the court to “withdraw” the motion to exclude and allow the parties to question the 
jurors privately so that their answers would not taint the panel.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.125, 
Ls.9-22.)  The court denied the state’s motion to excuse for cause, finding that 
“comments related to general or inherent distrust of the police is insufficient by itself.”  
(1/15/2016 Tr., p.125, L.23 – p.127, L.2.)  The court, however, “grant[ed] the alternative 
motion” to allow individual voir dire of the jurors.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.127, Ls.2-7.)   
During voir dire, the court initiated questioning of the first 74 members of the jury 
venire.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 2, p.168, L.1 – p.170, L.11.)  One of the court’s questions 
was:  “Is there anyone here for whom serving on a this [sic] jury would not just be 
somewhat inconvenient, but instead a real hardship?”  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.8, Ls.5-
7.)  Juror 55 raised her hand.  (See 1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.8, Ls.5-10.)  When asked --
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what the “real hardship” would be, Juror 55 answered:  “I take my father for chemo every 
Friday and I don’t have anyone else to do it.”  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.8, Ls.11-12.)  The 
court then engaged in the following dialogue with Juror 55: 
Q.  Ma’am, have you talked to the jury commissioner about that? 
 
A.  I have. 
 
Q.  Did she indicate whether or not that was something that we could 
accommodate? 
 
A.  She just told me to come in.  To drop him off at his appointment and 
come to court anyway. 
 
Q.  Well, I’m not sure that’s the answer I was wondering [sic].  I guess I 
was wondering if you had to be in court, would the jury commissioner be 
able to have somebody get your father and take him to treatment and take 
him back home?  She didn’t say that? 
 
A.  No.  
 
Q.  All right.  Well, I know that there are things we can do to 
accommodate special needs for jurors at various times. 
 
Ma’am, basically the trial plan in this case is to have essentially 
every other Friday off, but if this case goes three weeks, it could involve 
two Fridays.  Is there anything that you could do to make arrangements for 
your father in these circumstances? 
 
A.  I can’t guaranty [sic] that because I would have to find someone to 
take him and right now I don’t have anyone. 
 
Q.  Would that issue cause you to -- would that interfere with your ability 
to be fully attentive to the proceedings and not distracted by thinking 
about this? 
 
A.  I’ll say somewhat because based on his age, it’s best for me to go with 
him.  He is 89 years old, and I just need to be there to hear everything 
that’s going on with him.   
 
Q.  You don’t just take him, but you’re actually involved? 
 




Q.  And you’re involved in essentially communicating with the health care 
providers about his condition and such? 
 
A.  That is correct. 
 
Q.  Ma’am, are you asking to be excused from this jury based upon that 
hardship? 
 
A.  I am.  I mean, if I could get someone to take him, I would love to be 
here, but I can’t guaranty [sic] that until -- unless I’m chosen.  I’m sorry. 
 
Q.  In the past ten days or so since we filled out the questionnaire, have 
you tried to find somebody who might be able to help you with that? 
 
A.  I was actually hoping I would get a call on Friday and since I didn’t -- 
I’m sorry -- I didn’t really look for one.  But if I need to find someone, I 
will.  I’ll try. 
 
Q.  All right.  Wes, would you or Jim be able to go talk to Margie in the 
commissioner’s office to see if that’s something we can accommodate? 
Thank you, ma’am.  Please be seated. 
 
(1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.8, L.13 – p.10, L.16.) 
The state did not request individual voir dire of Juror 55 and passed the panel for 
cause.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.57, Ls.22-23, p.59, Ls.22-24.)  Both Douglas and Robins 
also declined individual voir dire of Juror 55 and passed the panel for cause.  (1/19/2016 
Tr., Vol. 1, p.59, L.25 – p.60, L.4, p.88, Ls.4-13; see also p.90, L.9 – p.91, L.7 (roll call 
of jury panel passed for cause).)  The state later exercised a peremptory challenge to 
excuse Juror 55.  (See 1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.91, L.8 – p.95, L.1.)  As a result, Douglas 
and Robins made a Batson challenge.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.92, L.3 – p.93, L.7.)  The 
argument in support of the Batson claim was that there was “one African-American in the 
entire panel,” and the state used a peremptory to excuse that individual.  (1/19/2016 Tr., 
Vol. 1, p.92, Ls.8-25 (punctuation altered).)  Douglas and Robins further argued that 
Juror 55 “upon being questioned by both parties – expressed an ability to be fair besides 
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some personal experiences in her life, caring for her father, etcetera,” but she was 
“otherwise” a “fair juror.”  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.93, Ls.1-6.) 
The state responded to the Batson challenge as follows: 
The first reason I already articulated last week, which was concerning to 
the state, which was she indicated that she believed police officers are 
unfair to Blacks.  And we have law enforcement testifying in this case 
against two African-American defendants. 
 
The second non-racial -- non-racially derived reason that we exercised our 
preempt in this case, Your Honor, is mainly because she specifically said 
she’s going to have a difficult time focusing on Fridays when her 89-
year[-]old father is sitting with some stranger getting chemo.  That’s the 
reason we exercised our challenge. 
 
We know under the schedule that we have significant detailed testimony 
coming on Friday.  We’re not interested in taking any chance.  So that’s 
the sole -- the main primary reason in addition to the fact that -- the 
reasons I’ve already articulated at our hearing last week.                
 
(1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.93, L.17 – p.94, L.10.) 
The defense agreed that, based on the state’s explanation, it was required to argue 
the “excuses” were “pretext,” but defense counsel declined to make any such argument, 
instead stating:  “I’m one of those people that take people at their word.”  (1/19/2016 Tr., 
Vol. 1, p.94, Ls.11-22.)  The court found there was “no overt racial purpose behind the 
strike” and, therefore, sustained the state’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 
55.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, L.23 – p.95, L.1.)    
Accepting that Douglas satisfied the first step of Batson based on the fact that 
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Juror 55 is African American,4 Douglas’ Batson claim fails for two related reasons.  First, 
the state offered race-neutral explanations for its challenge to Juror 55.  Specifically, as 
noted, the prosecutor cited Juror 55’s stated belief that the police are “unfair to black 
people” as well as Juror 55’s expressed “hardship” in relation to caring for her ill father.  
(1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.93, L.17 – p.94, L.10.)  Second, Douglas expressly accepted 
those reasons as race-neutral and declined to argue purposeful discrimination as required 
under the third step of the Batson test.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, Ls.11-22.)  Stated 
differently, Douglas effectively waived his Batson claim at that point.  See State v. 
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (“The invited error doctrine 
precludes a criminal defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting district court action and then 
successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.”); cf. State v. Stevens, 115 
Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The threshold inquiry in any appeal 
is whether an issue presented for review was preserved by a timely and specific objection 
at trial” because appellate courts generally will not consider unpreserved issues absent a 
showing of fundamental error.).   
Notwithstanding his prior acceptance of the state’s explanations as 
nondiscriminatory, Douglas argues on appeal that the first reason offered by the state – 
that Juror 55 believes the police are “unfair to blacks” – “invokes race on its face.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)  Setting aside the fact that Douglas cannot present an argument 
                                                 
4 In State v. Ornelas, 156 Idaho 727, 330 P.3d 1085 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court, relying 
on Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality), noted that “the first 
step is likely moot at this point.”  156 Idaho at 732, 330 P.3d at 1090.  In Hernandez, the 
Court stated:  “once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the 
peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie 
showing becomes moot.”  500 U.S. at 359.     
 
 14 
not raised below, his claim that the state’s explanation “invokes race on its face” 
misunderstands what Batson prohibits.  The mere mention of race does not demonstrate 
discrimination based on race.  The concern for purposes of Batson is whether a party is 
excusing a juror in order to “remove from the jury members of the defendant’s race.”  
Foster, 152 Idaho at 91, 266 P.3d at 1196; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362 (“Equal 
protection analysis turns on the intended consequences of government classifications.  
Unless the government actor adopted a criterion with the intent of causing the impact 
asserted, that impact itself does not violate the principle of race neutrality.”).  Although 
the state’s reason was based on Juror 55’s opinions implicating race, the state sought to 
excuse her because Juror 55 admitted those opinions could affect her ability to be 
impartial in evaluating the testimony of law enforcement.  The California Supreme Court 
explained the difference between a race-based reason and a race-related reason in People 
v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898 (Cal. 2009).  
In Hamilton, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge on a juror on the basis 
that the juror “had ‘considerable sympathy for Black people on trial’ and thought the 
justice system was unfair to Blacks.”  200 P.3d at 901.  The trial court rejected 
Hamilton’s argument that “rather than being race neutral, the challenge of [the juror] 
because of his attitudes about the treatment of Blacks in the justice system was itself race 
based,” ruling that “a challenge based solely on the prospective juror’s race is different 
from a challenge which may find its roots in part in the juror’s attitude about the justice 
system and about society which may be race related.”  Id. at 901-902 (quotations, 
brackets, and citation omitted).  The California Supreme Court agreed the trial court’s 




answers on his questionnaire, which “indicate[d] he harbored a skepticism regarding the 
fairness of the treatment of Blacks within the criminal justice system.”  Id.; see also id. at 
905 (affirming peremptory challenge to another prospective black juror in light of the 
prospective juror’s “answers hint[ing] that she might have harbored a bias in favor of a 
Black defendant and against the prosecution”); cf. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360-361 
(excluding jurors based on concerns they would not accept interpreter’s interpretation 
given their own ability to speak Spanish was a race-neutral reason for exercising 
peremptory challenges despite its race-related implications).   
As in Hamilton, the prosecutor in this case had a legitimate concern regarding 
Juror 55’s opinions in relation to the justice system.  Although those concerns were race 
related, Juror 55 was not excused on the basis of her race.  As such, Douglas rightfully 
acknowledged below, and the district court correctly concluded, that there was no Batson 
violation based on the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 55 due 
to her stated inability to be impartial.  This is especially true given that the “main primary 
reason” the state sought to exclude Juror 55 was due to the hardship Juror 55 herself 
identified in asking to be excused.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, Ls.5-10.)  While Douglas 
acknowledges that Juror 55’s hardship was a “permissible race-neutral reason” for 
removing her, he disregards the reason, claiming the “exercise of the peremptory 
challenge was still motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent,” and asserting 
that, as a result, “purposeful discrimination has been shown.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)  
Douglas’ “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent” argument is based on 
the framework articulated in Ornelas that is to be applied “where both permissible and 
impermissible reasons are provided at the second step.”  Ornelas, 156 Idaho at 737, 330 
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P.3d at 1095.  In that instance, “the court must determine if the peremptory strike was 
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent (race or gender).”  Id.  “If the 
peremptory strike was motived in substantial part by discriminatory intent, the challenger 
has met his burden of showing purposeful discrimination, as articulated in the third 
Batson step.”  Id.  To show “discriminatory intent,” a court may conduct a “comparative 
juror analysis,” which may involve a “‘side-by-side[] comparison of some black venire 
panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve.’”  Ornelas, 156 Idaho at 
737, 330 P.3d at 1095 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)).  If the 
same proffered reason is given for removing black and white jurors, a comparative 
analysis would show the absence of discriminatory intent.  See Ornelas, 156 Idaho at 737, 
330 P.3d at 1095 (citing Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241).       
For the reasons already stated, Douglas’ “motivated in substantial part” argument 
fails on its first premise – that there was any impermissible reason given for removing 
Juror 55.  Even if this Court concludes otherwise, Douglas’ argument still fails because it 
is unsupported by any argument demonstrating error by the district court in its conclusion 
that there was “no overt racial purpose behind the strike.”  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, 
Ls.23-25.)  It was Douglas’ burden below to persuade the court that discriminatory intent 
existed, and it is Douglas’ burden on appeal to show error in the district court’s 
conclusion that such intent did not exist.  Douglas has not satisfied either burden.  As 
noted, Douglas made no effort, using a comparative analysis or otherwise, to show 
discriminatory intent.  To the contrary, he took the prosecutor at her “word” that no such 
intent existed.  (1/19/2016 Tr., Vol. 1, p.94, Ls.16-22.)   
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Moreover, the only comparative evidence in the record that does exist was noted 
by the prosecutor.  Specifically, at the January 15, 2016 pretrial conference when the 
state first asked to remove Juror 55 for cause, the prosecutor noted that the parties had 
stipulated to the removal of several other jurors due to the inability to be impartial toward 
law enforcement.  (1/15/2016 Tr., p.119, L.10 – p.120, L.4.)  Any comparative analysis 
only bolsters the conclusion, acknowledged by Douglas below, that the prosecutor did not 
have discriminatory intent in removing Juror 55.          
Douglas has likewise failed to demonstrate error on appeal.  Douglas’ conclusory 
assertion that “the peremptory challenge was still motivated in substantial part by 
discriminatory intent” falls far short of meeting his burden.  Cf. State v. Kralovec, 161 
Idaho 569, 575 n.2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (2016) (conclusory arguments that a district 
court abused its discretion are “‘fatally deficient’ to the party’s case”); Murray v. State, 
156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if “either authority 
or argument is lacking” and declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to 
“provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to support his argument”).  Just because 
Douglas now claims it is so, does not make it so.  Douglas’ mere recitation of one of the 
prosecutor’s stated reasons, without any evidence of discriminatory intent, and without 
any comparative analysis, or any discussion of why he believes the district court’s finding 
of no discriminatory intent was unsupported by the evidence, is inadequate to show error.  
Compare Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369 (quotations, citation, and brackets omitted) (“We 
discern no clear error in the state trial court’s determination that the prosecutor did not 
discriminate on the basis of the ethnicity of Latino jurors.  We have said that where there 
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are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot 
be clearly erroneous.”).  Douglas’ Batson challenge is waived and, even if not waived, it 
fails.              
 
II. 
Douglas Has Failed To Show His Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel Was Violated 
When The District Court Denied His Request To Have The Ability To Call His Attorney 
Anytime He Wanted During “Regular Business Hours” 
 
A. Introduction 
 Douglas claims the district court erred in denying his motion requesting access to 
his attorney in the form of affording him the ability to call his attorney anytime he wanted 
during “regular business hours.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.19-25.)  Neither the facts nor the 
law support Douglas’ claim that he was denied meaningful access to his attorney as a 
result of limiting his telephone use to one scheduled hour per day.      
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.  State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003).   
 
C. Douglas’ Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel Was Not Violated When The 
District Court Denied His Request To Call Counsel Anytime During “Regular 
Business Hours” 
 
Douglas was represented by two private attorneys – Jack McMahon from 
Philadelphia and local counsel, Mark Manweiler.  (See R., pp.62, 65-67.)  Approximately 
four months prior to trial, Douglas’ co-defendant, Robins, filed a motion seeking an order 
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“compelling the State of Idaho and officials of the Ada County Jail to permit him 
reasonable access to a telephone in order to call his defense attorneys,” claiming he was 
being “denied reasonable access to counsel.”  (R., pp.268-269.)  Douglas subsequently 
filed a “notice of his [j]oinder” in Robins’ motion to “compel access” to counsel.  (R., 
pp.279-280.)   
The state filed a response to Douglas’ motion describing the limitations on access 
to the telephone in the maximum security unit where Douglas was confined.  (R., pp.281-
291.)  In that unit, “each inmate is allowed out of [his] cell one hour a day to go to the 
dayroom.  While in the dayroom, the inmate may shower, watch T.V., read books, use the 
telephone or go outside.”  (R., p.282.)  That one hour period is scheduled on a rotating 
basis between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m.  (R., p.282.)  For example, if an inmate’s one hour 
period is scheduled from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. on one day, he will be scheduled from 
7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. the following day, and from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. the day after 
that.  (R., p.282.)  “It takes two weeks to go through the entire day room schedule.”  (R., 
p.298; see, e.g., R., p.260.)  The state’s response further explained that in-person attorney 
visits “are unlimited.”  (R., p.282.)  “They can occur twenty-four (24) hours a day 
without prior notice to the jail.”  (R., p.282.)  Inmates may also communicate with their 
attorneys in writing.  (R., p.282.)   
The state’s response also outlined Douglas’ telephone use during the 271 days he 
had been in custody.  That use included “525 calls out” and 169 “completed calls,” 
totaling 42 hours on the phone.  (R., p.250.)  Of those 525 calls, Douglas dialed his 
previous attorney at the public defender’s office twice, made 91 calls to his out-of-state 




and he called his local attorney, Manweiler, 26 times, six of which were answered, for a 
total of 17 minutes on the phone.  (R., p.283.)  The remaining 406 calls Douglas made 
were to other individuals.  (See R., p.283 (“Out of the 525 calls Douglas had dialed, only 
22 % of them were to his attorneys.”).)       
At the hearing on the motion to compel, Douglas’ co-defendant, Robins, argued 
that, “when he needs to call his lawyer, he needs to call his lawyer,” and his access to 
counsel is “functionally denied” if he is forced to call “on a schedule.”  (9/23/2015 Tr., 
p.169, L.8 – p.170, L.14.)  Robins proposed the following “solution” – if he asks to call 
his lawyer, the jail must accommodate that request.  (9/23/2015 Tr., p.170, Ls.15-17.)  
Local counsel, Manweiler, argued on behalf of Douglas and “echo[ed]” Robins’ 
comments and made a “couple of other observations,” including that “lead counsel” 
cannot make personal visits because he “reside[s] two time zones away” and access to 
local counsel was of limited value because he had not “read all of the discovery” and was 
“not able to engage in substantive discussions.”  (9/23/2015 Tr., p.172, L.12 – p.173, 
L.5.)  Manweiler further argued:  “Yes, they can get ahold of us if they happen to be 
lucky enough to have their hour during business hours and decide not to use it to 
exercise, not to use it to relax and watch TV, not to use it to communicate with their 
families,” and are “fortunate enough” to call Manweiler when he is “not in court” “or 
otherwise speaking with clients and unable to take [his] calls.”  (9/23/2015 Tr., p.173, 
Ls.5-13.)  Manweiler advised the court he was “only” asking that Douglas be allowed to 
call “local counsel or lead counsel during regular business hours.”  (9/23/2015 Tr., p.173, 




  The court denied Douglas’ motion “unless and until” he showed he was actually 
prejudiced by the telephone schedule.5  (9/23/2015 Tr., p.183, Ls.5-8.)  The district court 
did not err in denying Douglas’ request to call his attorney outside his scheduled access 
to the telephone.  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords criminal 
defendants the right to counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).  It 
does not, however, give defendants the right to unfettered access to counsel.  Douglas, 
however, contends his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was 
violated because, he argues, “the jail interfered with an opportunity for meaningful 
consultation with counsel by limiting [his] phone access to one hour a day, at times at an 
hour outside of business hours.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.23.)  Fatal to Douglas’ claim is 
that he has never demonstrated, below or on appeal, that he was actually denied access to 
his attorneys as a result of the telephone schedule.  In fact, the evidence in the record 
demonstrates that Douglas had plenty of opportunities to call his attorneys during 
“regular business hours.”  For example, during the month of May 2015, Douglas made 21 
unanswered calls to his attorney between 10:00 a.m. MST and 2:00 p.m. MST, which, 
assuming an 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. work day, would be during “regular business hours” 
in both Idaho and Philadelphia.  (R., pp.299-300.)  That Douglas’ attorney did not answer 
any of those calls does not mean the state deprived Douglas of access to his attorneys, nor 
does it demonstrate that the jail should have adjusted Douglas’ time to use the telephone 
in order to make additional potentially unanswered calls.   
                                                 
5 The court also denied Robins’ motion for the same reason.  (9/23/2015 Tr., p.183, Ls.5-
8.)     
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The evidence in the record also reflects that, during May 2015, Douglas had other 
opportunities to call his attorneys during “regular business hours,” but apparently elected 
not to do so.  (R., pp.299-300.)  While Douglas may have also used his time out of his 
cell to “take a shower, exercise, and speak to his family” (Appellant’s Brief, p.23), those 
activities are not mutually exclusive to calling his attorney and, in any event, Douglas’ 
personal choices about how to use his time fall far short of demonstrating he was denied 
access to his attorneys.    
Further, regardless of the time of day Douglas had access to the telephone, even if 
Douglas could call his attorneys anytime he wanted during “business hours,” there was 
no guarantee his calls would be answered at those times either.  As Douglas 
acknowledges on appeal, attorneys do not sit around their offices waiting for their clients 
to call.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.24.)  Rather, if a client wishes to speak to his attorney, the 
common practice surely involves the client leaving a message for counsel, which Douglas 
could have done anytime he called.  This example illustrates why Douglas’ argument that 
“counsel cannot know other than by a phone call that the jailed client has an issue he 
wants to discuss” (Appellant’s Brief, p.24) does not support his claimed Sixth 
Amendment violation.   
Finally, to the extent Douglas specifically complains that he needed more 
“opportunities to call his Pennsylvania lawyer” (Appellant’s Brief, p.25), it is worth 
noting that Douglas’ Pennsylvania lawyer was unavailable, even by phone, for several 
hearings, including the status conference on September 2, 2015, the pretrial conference 
on December 14, 2015, and the pretrial conference on January 8, 2016.  (9/2/2015 Tr., 
p.6, Ls.1-9; 12/14/2015 Tr., p.22, Ls.9-19; 1/8/2016 Tr., p.67, Ls.7-18.)  Douglas’ 
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“Pennsylvania lawyer,” McMahon, also left town after the case was submitted to the jury 
on January 27, 2016, and before the jury returned its verdict the following day, January 
28, 2016, telling the court that, even if the jury had a question, he did not “think that’s 
really anything that we would have any great weighing in on anyhow.”  (1/27/2016 Tr., 
p.374, L.23 – p.381, L.23; 1/28/2016 Tr., p.385, L.21 – p.390, L.3.)  Douglas consented 
to McMahon’s departure.  (1/27/2016 Tr., p.379, L.16 – p.380, L.6.)           
Douglas is not entitled to relief based on the limitations on his time to use the 
telephone, especially given Douglas’ complete failure to identify how he was ever 
prejudiced as a result of the jail’s telephone schedule.   
 
III. 
Douglas Has Failed To Present Any Basis For Finding Error In The District Court’s 




 Douglas moved for a mistrial after Detective Josiah Ransom testified that, in his 
efforts to identify Douglas, he received information through the DEA that a confidential 
informant “mentioned a murder in Boise and said the person was possibly living in 
Redington, Pennsylvania.”  (1/25/2016 Tr., p.260, L.25 – p.266, L.15.)  The district court 
gave a curative instruction in relation to the testimony and denied Douglas’ motion.  
(1/25/2016 Tr., p.267, L.16 – p.269, L.4.)  Both the law and the facts support the district 
court’s decision.  To the extent Douglas has presented adequate argument for the Court to 




B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review applicable to the refusal of a trial court to grant a mistrial 
upon a motion in a criminal case is well established: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made.  Rather, the question must be whether the event 
which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error 
when viewed in the context of the full record.  Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the ‘abuse of discretion’ 
standard is a misnomer.  The standard, more accurately stated, is one of 
reversible error.  [The appellate court’s] focus is upon the continuing 
impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion.  The 
trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that 
incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
 
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State 
v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)).  Because the right 
to due process guarantees only a fair trial, not an error-free one, “error is not reversible 
unless it is shown to be prejudicial.”  Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136 (citing 
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993)).  “Error will be 
deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction.”  Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855 P.2d at 895 (citations omitted). 
 
C. Douglas Has Failed To Articulate Any Basis For Concluding That, Under The 
Applicable Legal Standards, He Is Entitled To A New Trial Based On Detective 
Ransom’s Stricken Testimony That The Jury Was Instructed To Disregard  
 
“A mistrial may be declared, upon the defendant’s motion, if there has been an 
error or legal defect during the trial which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the 
defendant of a fair trial.”  State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (citing I.C.R. 29.1); accord, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 724, 366 P.3d 
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644, 646 (Ct. App. 2015).  “The admission of improper evidence does not automatically 
require the declaration of a mistrial.”  Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646 (citing 
State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004)).  Rather, “[t]he 
core inquiry” when denial of a mistrial is challenged on appeal is “whether it appears 
from the record that the event triggering the mistrial motion contributed to the verdict, 
leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the 
same result had the event not occurred.”  State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 75, 675 P.2d 49, 54 
(Ct. App. 1983).  In conducting this inquiry, the appellate court “normally presume[s] 
that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence.”  State v. 
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 768, 274 P.3d 1279, 1283 (Ct. App. 2012).   To overcome the 
presumption, a defendant claiming error in the denial of a mistrial motion must show 
“there is an overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to follow the court’s 
instructions and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence [was] devastating to the 
defendant.”  Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724-25, 366 P.3d at 646-47 (citation omitted).  Where, as 
here, a defendant claims a curative instruction was insufficient to remedy the prejudicial 
effect of inadmissible evidence, the appellate court’s analysis focuses not only on the 
curative instruction, but also on the “strength of the evidence” and “the significance of 
the improperly disclosed information.”  Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274 P.3d at 1283; 
Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 725, 366 P.3d at 647.  
The basis for Douglas’ motion for mistrial was the following testimony from 
Detective Ransom in response to the question, “So, at that point, tell us how you tried to 
figure out who John C. Douglas is”: 
We had obviously previously received some information that that 
person was associated with Pennsylvania.  Also, there had been -- we’d 
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received a call from, I believe, a DEA agent from back East who said that 
they had a CI who had mentioned a murder in Boise.  Sorry.  Confidential 
informant who mentioned a murder in Boise and said that the person was 
possibly living in Redington, Pennsylvania --  
 
(1/25/2016 Tr., p.260, L.25 – p.261, L.9.) 
Douglas’ counsel objected, arguing, in relevant part: 
. . . [T]he testimony is out there that a DEA informant, so that’s a 
drug enforcement agency, has an informant that has indicated that John 
Douglas, a person that lives in that area, is connected to the murder in 
Boise.  And that was all in connection of how they went and got arrested 
and how they arrested John Douglas.  
 
What that, in effect, has done, Your Honor, has allowed the jury to 
hear that an unnamed, unknown person who’s an informant for a drug 
agency has identified my client as a participant in the -- or related to the 
homicide in Boise, Idaho.  And our defense obviously is that he didn’t do 
this.  And now, they have that testimony before the jury.   
 
I don’t know who this person is.  I don’t – can’t cross examine 
him.  It’s hearsay.  It’s for all those reasons – and it’s extraordinarily 
prejudicial.  It’s not just some minor hearsay.  It goes to the essence of the 
defense that it’s not this particular individual.  And they have established 
through inadmissible, confidential informant hearsay that my client is 
involved in this incident.   
 
(1/25/2016 Tr., p.262, L.17 – p.263, L.12.) 
 Douglas further argued that a mistrial was required because, in his opinion, he 
could not get a “fair shake” in light of the testimony that a “DEA confidential informant 
sa[id] he [was] guilty.”  (1/25/2016 Tr., p.263, L.19 – p.264, L.2.)  Douglas continued:   
 So, again, Your Honor, if it was something that was tangential, 
something that was not the ultimate final issue for this jury to decide, I 
would agree to maybe a curative instruction.  But when it is the ultimate 
issue of the case and it is so significant and we don’t have a chance, it’s so 
prejudicial, I think a mistrial must be granted.  
 
(1/25/2016 Tr., p.267, Ls.9-15.)       
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 While the district court agreed that the testimony was objectionable since it was 
“unresponsive” and “double hearsay,” it disagreed with Douglas that it was “so highly 
prejudicial that it require[d] a mistrial.”  (1/25/2016 Tr., p.267, Ls.17-22.)  The court, 
therefore, denied the motion for mistrial, and instructed the jury:   
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before we broke, there was some 
testimony quite frankly that was nonresponsive and double hearsay.  You 
are advised and informed that that testimony has been stricken from the 
record, you are to disregard it and you are not to consider it for any 
purposes in the course of your deliberations.  We’ll have a written 
instruction on this when we do final instructions as well.  
 
(1/25/2016 Tr., p.268, L.22 – p.269, L.4.) 
 Consistent with the court’s representation regarding a written instruction, the jury 
received Instruction No. 14 advising it that it was to decide the facts from the evidence 
presented, identifying the types of evidence it could consider, and the types of evidence it 
could not consider, which included “testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or that 
[it] ha[]d been instructed to disregard.”  (R., p.470.) 
 This Court can easily conclude that Detective Ransom’s challenged and stricken 
testimony did not contribute to the verdicts in this case.  While Douglas’ hearsay and 
confrontation concerns were valid, those concerns did not require a mistrial.  Ruiz, supra.  
It was no secret that Douglas lived in Pennsylvania, was in Boise at the time of the 
murders, and was affiliated with others, including Robins, who were associated with the 
victims.  Detective Ransom detailed those connections throughout his testimony.  (See, 
e.g., 1/20/2016 Tr., pp.445-448; 1/25/2016 Tr., pp.259-260, 287, 289, 294; 1/26/2016 Tr., 
pp.8-10.)  Most significantly, Jeanette Juraska identified Douglas as the killer prior to 
trial and at trial before Detective Ransom made any reference to the DEA’s confidential 




(1/22/2016 Tr., p.60, L.21 – p.62, L.16.)  Anton Raider, who pled guilty to aiding and 
abetting attempted murder in relation to this case, also testified that Douglas came to 
town a few days prior to the murders, Raider gave Douglas a gun, bought bullets for the 
gun, and he heard Douglas say he did not need a disguise because “he would be the last 
person they ever saw.”  (1/25/2016 Tr., pp.45-47, 50-61, 77, 114.)  Raider also testified 
about Douglas’ behavior after the murders, which included coming back to his house 
“breathing heavily,” “look[ing] nervous,” “sweating a lot,” and Douglas washing a “red 
substance” off his shoes.  (1/25/2016 Tr., p.54, L.8 – p.55, L.2.)  Raider’s testimony also 
preceded Detective Ransom’s objected-to testimony that triggered Douglas’ motion for a 
mistrial.  Detective Ransom’s stricken testimony about an unidentified confidential 
informant “mention[ing] a murder in Boise” involving someone from Pennsylvania did 
not require a mistrial, much less a new trial.          
Notwithstanding the insignificance of Detective Ransom’s stricken testimony, and 
the existence of the curative instruction, Douglas asserts the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.29.)  The entirety of 
Douglas’ argument in relation to this claim is: 
 The defense attorney’s point was valid.  This was not police 
volunteered testimony on a tangential issue.  Rather, it was direct evidence 
of the ultimate issue, whether Mr. Douglas committed the murders in 
Boise or not.  Further, it inserted the DEA into the mix.  While there was 
evidence that others may well have been trafficking in controlled 
substances, there was none that Mr. Douglas was.  Jeanette Juraska 
testified she had seen Mr. Douglas at a medical marijuana trim house in 
California.  (Tr. 1/22/2016, p. 51, ln. 10-18.)  Yet now the jury was told 
that he was significant enough to be part of a DEA investigation.  
 
 Further, the curative instruction was, as defense counsel argued, 
insufficient to actually have the jury members put the evidence that Mr. 




 Accordingly, the court erred by denying the motion for mistrial. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.29 (emphasis original).)     
Characterizing Detective Ransom’s testimony as “direct evidence” that Douglas 
“committed the murders” is a stretch because there was no indication by Detective 
Ransom that the confidential informant claimed to have actually witnessed the murders.  
Juraska, on the other hand, did witness the murders, was shot herself, and identified 
Douglas as the shooter.  That is direct evidence.  And, Raider’s testimony, although not 
direct evidence of the murders themselves, was direct evidence that Douglas took a gun, 
claimed he would be the last person the victims ever saw, and exhibited behaviors after 
the murders that were consistent with him being the shooter.  Detective Ransom’s 
stricken testimony was hardly prejudicial by comparison.   
Douglas’ secondary concern, that Detective Ransom’s reference to the DEA was 
somehow specifically prejudicial to him, is particularly unpersuasive given Douglas’ 
acknowledgement that “there was evidence that others may well have been trafficking in 
controlled substances.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.29.)  Indeed, trafficking in marijuana was 
central to this case as it was the underlying motive for the murders.  Even Douglas’ 
defense attorney emphasized this fact in cross-examining Detective Ransom, at one point 
noting in the context of a question that marijuana was the “genesis of this whole thing.”  
(1/26/2016 Tr., p.66, Ls.13-15.)  The evidence implicating Douglas in the marijuana trade 
was hardly dependent on Detective Ransom’s reference to the DEA.  In fact, Detective 
Ransom’s testimony did not itself communicate any contention that the DEA was 
investigating Douglas for trafficking, as Douglas claims.  To suggest that Detective 
Ransom’s testimony regarding the DEA, which the jury was advised to disregard, 
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somehow painted Douglas as a drug user is hollow given the focal point of drugs in this 
case, including Douglas’ own presence at a “marijuana trim house,” whether the “trim 
house” was for “medicinal” purposes or not.6       
In addition to complaining about the substance of Detective Ransom’s stricken 
testimony, Douglas contends the curative instruction was “insufficient.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.29.)  However, Douglas offers no argument on why this is so.  Rather, he appears 
to want the Court to engage in the presumption that it was not followed when the 
presumption is exactly the opposite, and despite the fact that it is his burden to explain 
why there is an “overwhelming probability” that the jury was unable to do so.  Ruiz, 159 
Idaho at 724-725, 366 P.3d at 646-647.  “Absent compelling circumstances dictating the 
opposite conclusion,” the court’s curative instructions must be deemed to have been “an 
effective remedy” for any potential prejudice occasioned by Detective Ransom’s 
testimony.  State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 302, 297 P.3d 257, 265 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  Having made no real effort to meet his burden in this regard, this 
Court need not consider Douglas’ conclusory claim that the curative instruction was 
inadequate.  Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 575 n.2, 388 P.3d at 589 n.2; Murray, 156 Idaho at 
168, 321 P.3d at 718.  Even if considered, any assertion that the jury was unable to follow 
the curative instruction because Detective Ransom’s testimony was “devastating” is 
belied by the record.   
                                                 
6 Juraska’s testimony was that she was in California to “trim medical marijuana”; she did 
not say that the “trim house” was a “medical marijuana trim house,” much less that 
Douglas was only there for medicinal purposes.  (1/22/2016 Tr., p.51, Ls.10-18.) 
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Douglas has failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court erred in 
denying his motion for mistrial, much less that he is entitled to a new trial based on the 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and sentences 
entered upon the jury verdicts finding Douglas guilty of two counts of first degree murder 
and one count of attempted first degree murder. 
 DATED this 12th day of September, 2017. 
 
 
      
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_____________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO  
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